Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Miles Tucker
Research
I specialize in ethics and metaethics. I defend consequentialism, non-naturalism, and Mooreanism about intrinsic value.
Publications
Consequentialism and Our Best Selves. Philosophical Studies (2022)
I develop and defend a maximizing theory of moral motivation: I claim that consequentialists should recommend only those desires, emotions, and dispositions that will make the outcome best. I advance a conservative account of the motives that are possible for us; I say that a motive is an alternative if and only if it is in our psychological control. The resulting theory is less demanding than its competitors. It also permits us to maintain many of the motivations that we value most, including our love for those most important to us. I conclude that we are closer to meeting morality’s demands on our character than has been appreciated.
Moore, Brentano, and Scanlon: A Defense of Indefinability. Philosophical Studies (2020)
Mooreans claim that intrinsic goodness is a conceptual primitive. Fitting-attitude theorists object: they say that goodness should be defined in terms of what it is fitting for us to value. The Moorean view is often considered a relic; the fitting-attitude view is increasingly popular. I think this unfortunate. I dedicate myself to the influential arguments marshaled against Moore’s program, including those advanced by Scanlon, Stratton-Lake and Hooker, and Jacobson; I argue that they do not succeed.
From an Axiological Standpoint. Ratio (2019)
I maintain that intrinsic value is the fundamental concept of axiology. Many disagree; they say the proper object of value theory is final value. I examine extant accounts of the nature of final value. In each case, I argue that the concept of final value described is either identical with the classical notion of intrinsic value or is not a plausible candidate for the primary concept of axiology.
Simply Good: A Defense of the Principia. Utilitas (2018)
Moore's moral program is increasingly unpopular. Judith Jarvis Thomson's attack has been influential; she says the Moorean project fails because ‘there is no such thing as goodness’. I argue that her objection fails: while Thomson is correct that the kind of generic goodness she targets is incoherent, it is not, I believe, the kind of goodness central to the Principia.
The Pen, the Dress and the Coat: A Confusion in Goodness. Philosophical Studies (2016)
Conditionalists say that the value something has as an end—its final value—may be conditional on its extrinsic features. I attend to the three most popular examples given to support the conditional position; I argue that they do not succeed.
Two Kinds of Value Pluralism. Utilitas (2016)
I claim that there are two distinct views called ‘value pluralism’ in contemporary axiology, but that these positions have not been properly stated or distinguished. I separate and elucidate these views, and show how the distinction between them affects the contemporary debate about value pluralism.
Education
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Ph.D. Philosophy (2017)
Dissertation: "The Concept of Intrinsic Goodness: Essays in Moorean Moral Philosophy"
Director: Fred Feldman.
EmploymenT
Virginia Commonwealth University
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
2019-Present
Starke House, #304
915 W. Franklin St.
Richmond, VA 23284